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Abstract 
Corporate governance is one of the most imperative research topics all over the world for its contribution to the 
corporations and the global economy. Besides, Asian economy is currently the major contributor of the world 
economy. Laws and regulations in the Asian region have been enacted extensively and different standards have 
been developed during the last decade. This descriptive study attempts to summarize these developments in Asia 
along with the discussion of core concept of corporate governance for the new researchers in this field and other 
concern parties. 
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1 Introduction 
The guidelines and methods through which corporations are governed is corporate governance. It helps to 
resolve the potential conflicts of interest amongst the stakeholders (shareholders, management, public 
administration, personnel dependent, consumers, etc.) in one corporate structure. More accountability and 
transparency to the investors is ensured through corporate governance. Therefore, a sound corporate governance 
supports companies to operate more competently, diminish risk, provide protection against mismanagement and 
ensure smooth access to capital which will support the growth of the companies. By means of better access to 
capital, corporate governance encourages new investments, enhances economic development and delivers 
employment opportunities. The main objective of corporate governance is to maximize and enhance 
shareholder’s value and guard the interest of other stake holders of the community. Therefore, corporate 
governance became a key issue to the concern policymakers after the Asian financial crisis of 1997.  
This study attempts to explore the evolution of corporate governance in the Asian region in connection with the 
clarification of the core concept. Thus, this research will help the apprentice researchers in the field of corporate 
governance by providing solid start point for further detailed specific research, along with the scholars, 
policymakers and other concerning bodies by giving an insight regarding the evaluation of corporate governance 
of Asia. 
 
2 Objectives 
• To depict the concept of corporate governance.  
• To investigate the evolution of corporate governance in Asia.  
 
3 Methodology  
This study is a secondary data based descriptive research. Different articles from journals and other published 
reports from different financial organizations had been used in this research. The first objective of describing the 
corporate governance concept is achieved through the study of earlier literatures. Evolution of corporate 
governance, the second objective, is investigated through the reports of concern financial institutions and with 
the help of information in relevant websites.  
 
4 Theoretical Framework:  
Scholars discussed the concept "Corporate Governance" from different perspectives. According to Magdi and 
Nadereh (2002), corporate governance is about ensuring that the business is run well and investors receive a fair 
return. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; 1999) offers a wider definition of 
corporate governance. OECD defines corporate governance as the system by which business corporations are 
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation such as, the board, managers, shareholders and 
other stakeholders. It also defines the rules and procedures for taking decisions on corporate matters. Uche 
(2004) and Wolfensohn (1999) also discussed corporate governance in similar perspective. They argued that 
corporate governance is the mechanism through which the company’s goals are set, the ways of achieving those 
goals are defined and it will monitor performance accordingly. 
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Potential conflicts of interest among participants (stakeholders) in the corporate structure create the need for 
corporate governance in a corporate setting. Imam and Malik (2007) identified two major causes behind this 
conflict. Firstly, difference in the participants’ preferences and goals. Secondly, lack of perfect information 
among participants about each other’s knowledge, actions and preferences.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) addressed these conflicts by examining the separation of corporate 
ownership from corporate management. They claims that this separation provides executives with the ability to 
act in their own self-interest rather than in the interests of shareholders in absence of other corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
Bostan and Grosu (2010) mentioned the objectives of the systems of governance in a slightly different 
manner. According to them, the objectives are to provide integrity management and guidance to maximize the 
created value for shareholders and to provide a transparent and timely communication system. The transparent 
communication system is the key instrument that can prevent accounting frauds. The link between information 
and frauds prevention is independent of the mode of corporate governance adopted by the organization structure 
and the control mechanism. 
Corporate governance can be constituted through different indexes in an organization. Kajola (2008) 
discussed some of these critical factors briefly. Four key mechanisms discussed in his study are briefly presented 
here. 
 
Board Size 
Kajola (2008) suggested that the board size should be within a limit considering the firm’s width of operation. 
Though the larger board size helps in monitoring, but it also increases the chance of poor communication and 
delayed decision making. His empirical research on board size provided this conclusion that board size and firm 
value are negatively related. Large boards are less effective and those are easier for the CEOs to control (Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992). It becomes difficult to coordinate and for it to process and tackle strategic problems of the 
organization when board size becomes bigger. Yermack (1996) also finds the negative correlation between board 
size and profitability when conducted study on Finland. Other researchers also find the similar outcome: small 
sized boards are positively related to high firm performance (Mak and Kusnadi, 2005; Eisenberg, Sundgren and 
Wells, 1998). Sanda et al (2003) reported that firm performance is positively correlated with small, as opposed to 
large boards in a study conducted in Nigeria. 
 
Board Composition 
Board composition is another key consideration which constitute the corporate governance. Young (2003) argued 
that enhanced director independence is inevitably attractive. According to the proponents of agency theory, 
corporate governance should lead to higher stock prices or better long-term performance, because managers are 
better supervised and agency costs are decreased. But the findings from the empirical studies of the effect of 
board membership and structure on firm value or performance dramatically show either mixed results or 
opposite to what would be expected from the arguments of agency cost. Even some studies reveals better 
performances in the firms dominated by the outsiders (John and Senbet, 1998; Mehran, 1995; Resenstein and 
Wyatt, 1990; Weiback 1988). On the contrary, Pinteris (2002) found no such relationship in terms of profitability 
or firm value. Forsberg (1989) found no such relationship between the proportion of outside directors and 
different performance measures. Similarly, studies of Bhagat and Black (2002) and Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) also found that poorly performing firms were more likely to increase the independence of their boards. 
Some other group of researchers found that firm performance is not significantly linked to a higher proportion of 
the board members from outside (Klein, 1998; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Mac Avoy, Dana, Cantor and Peck, 
1983). Therefore, it can be concluded that the impact of the proportion of outside directors on the firm 
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performance is mixed.  
 
Audit Committee 
Of the limited literatures on audit committee, Klein (2002) found that the earnings management and audit 
committee are negatively correlated. Few other researchers reported that entirely independent audit committees 
tend to have lower debt financing costs (Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2004). 
 
CEO Status 
When the same person holds the two critical positions of CEO and chairman, agency problems are expected to 
be higher. Several studies examined the separation of CEO and chairman of the board. . Experimenting on a 
sample of 452 firms of USA, Yermack (1996) confirmed that firms where the CEO and the board chairman are 
different persons, are more valuable. 
 
5 Corporate Governance in Asia 
The year 1997 with the Asian Financial Crisis, can be marked as a buzz for the Asian policy makers and 
companies. The crisis uncovered many institutional and policy weaknesses in this region and urged multiple 
reforms. Corporate governance concept and practices moved widely in this region since 1999. Number of rules, 
laws and regulation had been enacted, standards improved and enforcement strengthened.  
Here, in this study, experiences from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), some 
key observations of OECD-Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable in 2014 and corporate governance success 
stories of some Asian countries through IFC had been presented.  
 
5.1 The OECD Experience 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance are highly praised and practiced in the Asian region. Practically, 
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and outputs of the Asian Roundtable are being used by all Asian 
economies as references in the development of their corporate governance codes, regulations, scorecards, listing 
rules and even in academic works. In the countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Viet 
Nam and Thailand, the ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard incorporates the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance as a major benchmark to evaluate the listed companies. Notably, the promise by Asian 
authorities to improve their corporate governance situations across the region is even greater.  
Since its inception, Asian region made number of achievements with OECD in the last 15 years. Key 
accomplishments are:  
• The commencement of a corporate governance structure 
• Extensive enactment of the global standards under the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
• Higher level of responsiveness and practice of the OECD Principles as a best practice benchmark 
The Fidelity analysts’ survey covering 1000 stocks through the Asia-Pacific found that 21% of the companies 
within Asia are following a global corporate governance standard in their internal or external operations. This 
survey concludes that the application of corporate governance is on the rise in Asia. Continuous improvement in 
the corporate governance practices is observed among Asian companies since the Asian financial crisis.  
 
5.2 Observations of OECD-Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable; 2014 
Company law and securities law are frequently updated in all Asian Roundtable economies to incorporate new 
developments. Demonstrating the benefit of being able to draw on other jurisdictions’ experiences, Roundtable 
economies have made liberal use of legislation and practices from other economies as a source of inspiration 
when strengthening their own systems. 
Recent examples of legal reform in different countries of Asia are summarized here:  
• Amendments to the Companies Act in Malaysia in 2007 and 2010 to introduce enhanced and clarified 
regulation of related party transactions, strengthened shareholder rights, and a better defined role of the 
board. 
• Amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act in Thailand in 2007 to provide stronger protection for 
investors’ interests, to enhance corporate governance of listed companies and to make key governance 
recommendations mandatory. 
• The reform of the Companies Ordinance in Hong Kong, China was passed by the legislative council in 
2012. The new Ordinance introduces enhanced accountability of directors, more shareholder 
engagement in the decision-making process and improved disclosure of company information. 
• The Ministry of Finance in Singapore released a draft Companies Bill in May 2013, to amend the 
current Companies Act, based on the recommendations of the Steering Committee it had appointed in 
2007. Key changes include the lessening of regulatory burdens on companies while rules and principles 
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ensuring transparency and accountability, including directors’ duties would be strengthened.  
• The 2013 Companies Act in India makes comprehensive reforms to virtually all areas affecting 
corporate governance. The reforms include increased requirements for independent directors, more 
director duties, the introduction of shareholder class action suits and the proposal of the expanded use of 
e-governance for various company processes.  
• In case of Bangladesh, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Bangladesh Bank (BB), the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB), Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), the 
Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB) are some of the pioneer bodies 
working for ensuring better corporate governance in the country. Their efforts include publication of 
code of corporate governance for Bangladesh, different reports, organization of seminars, issuance of 
notification etc (Bhuiyan and Biswas, 2007).  
• The Indonesian Company Law update of 2007 introduced fiduciary duties and responsibilities for 
commissioners and directors. The new Company Law also put the three main corporate organs in 
Indonesia, the general shareholder meeting, the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Directors on 
equal footing for the first time. 
• In Chinese Taipei, updates to the Company Act between 2005 and 2012 enhanced the accountability of 
directors and introduced cumulative and e-voting.  
 
5.3 Success stories through IFC
1
 
With strong donor support, IFC continues to strengthen corporate governance programs in underserved regions, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and East Asia and the Pacific, by closely integrating its 
investments and advice, and focusing on capacity building of intermediaries, resulting in improved operational 
efficiency. 
In 2013, we nearly doubled our firm-level corporate governance engagements. Thirty-one development finance 
institutions have now adopted the Corporate Governance Development Framework, which is based on IFC’s 
methodology. 
In Central Asia, local partners have been independently delivering corporate governance services in their 
markets, both in terms of training as well as consulting services. In China, we established a partnership with the 
Association of Public Companies to update the China Corporate Governance Guidelines for Listed Companies, 
develop a White Paper on Corporate Governance in China, train board directors, supervisors and senior 
executives of locally-listed companies, and research specific corporate governance issues.  
Some of the success stories of different countries of Asia with the support of IFC have been presented here:  
 
Country: Indonesia  
Client: Mitra Bisnis Keluarga Ventura (MBK)  
In 2013 IFC approved an investment (debt and equity) of $9 million for this Indonesian micro-finance company 
with over 300,000 micro clients, mostly women. An equity investment agreement was also signed by IFC and 
MBK. IFC also provided corporate governance assistance to help the company improve the structure and 
composition of the boards and implement good governance principles that, in turn, will help prepare the 
company to attract new investors. This IFC investment will enable the company to scale up its microfinance 
outreach, thus helping improve the quality of lives of women in Indonesia. Further, by having a sound corporate 
governance structure in place the company can become a standard setter for more sustainable and professionally-
run microfinance institutions in the country.  
IFC corporate governance support: Provided assistance to improve the structure and composition of the boards 
and implement good governance principles.  
 
Country: Bangladesh  
Client: Butterfly Marketing Limited  
In FY2013, IFC invested $6.4 million in equity in Butterfly Marketing Limited, a family-owned business in 
Bangladesh. The company is one of the largest retail companies of refrigerators, televisions and air conditioners 
in the country. With a store network of 199 outlets and 340 dealers, Butterfly Marketing Limited currently has 
the second largest market share in the refrigerator market and the largest in the air conditioner market. IFC also 
provided corporate governance assistance to strengthen its governance structure offering advice on board 
composition, establishing an audit committee and appointment of an external auditor. The corporate governance 
improvements were a condition for investment, and all of the shareholders have signed on to implement the 
corporate governance improvement plan.  
IFC corporate governance support: Provided assistance to strengthen the company’s governance structure 
                                                          
1 Investment Operations and Advisory Services Project Summaries of IFC: March 2014 
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offering advice on board composition, establishing an audit committee and appointment of an external auditor.  
 
Country: Pakistan  
Client: Matco Rice Processing Limited  
In 2012 IFC made a $4.9 million equity investment in Matco Rice Processing Limited, a family-owned firm and 
the country’s leading basmati-rice exporter. The investment is part of an $18 million project that integrates rice 
paddy procuring and processing. The investment came about after one of the company’s board members attended 
a corporate governance leadership training offered by the IFC-supported Pakistan Institute of Corporate 
Governance. Seeing value in the training, the board member invited the institute to conduct a corporate 
governance workshop for Matco’s board to address the role, authority, and fiduciary duties of the board and its 
structure and composition. This enabled Matco to make necessary changes and position itself as a viable investee 
client.  
IFC corporate governance support: Provided corporate governance leadership training to IFC-supported 
organization, which in turn provided training to the company on the role, authority, and fiduciary duties of the 
board and its structure and composition.  
 
Country: Mongolia  
Client: Khan Bank  
In 2011, IFC committed a $20 million subordinated loan to Khan Bank, as part of a $50 million external 
financing from a strategic investor as a result of improved corporate governance. Khan Bank is a leading 
commercial bank in Mongolia with 500 branches and over 4,000 employees. It provides financial services to 
more than 80 percent of the households in that country. IFC provided advisory support to the bank to make 
improvements to its corporate governance practices to support the client’s plan to go IPO in overseas stock 
exchanges in the next two to three years. IFC identified key risks, including unclear authority line between the 
board and senior executives. In 2013, IFC invested in a $40 million subordinated loan from the IFC Asset 
Management Company, together with $71 million in IFC syndicated and parallel loans to Khan Bank.  
IFC/corporate governance support: Provided support to make improvements to the bank’s corporate governance 
practices to go for an IPO. IFC identified key risks, including unclear authority line between the board and senior 
executives; ineffective communications between the board and management; ineffectiveness of the board 
committees; related party transactions issues and conflict of interest issues and proposed an improvement plan.  
 
Country: India  
Client: Craftsman  
In 2011, IFC made a $13.6 million equity investment in Craftsman, a family-owned firm in India with revenues 
of about $120 million in fiscal year 2011. As part of IFC’s $13.6 million equity investment, IFC provided 
advisory support to the company that helped improve its corporate governance practices, including reducing the 
family’s representation on the board, nominating two independent directors, and hiring a chief financial officer. 
Craftsman also had to form an audit committee comprised solely of independent directors. The only 
recommendation pending is formation of the audit committee. Standard Chartered PE invested about Rs 850 
million 18 months ago.  
IFC corporate governance support: Provided support to help improve its corporate governance practices, 
including reducing the family’s representation on the board, nominating two independent directors, and hiring a 
chief financial officer.  
 
5.4 A roadmap for improving corporate governance infrastructure 
After surveying challenges and progress, as well as engaging in an extensive consultation process among 
Roundtable participants, the original 2003 White Paper priorities were updated in 2011 with the publication of 
Reform Priorities in Asia – Taking Corporate Governance to a Higher Level. The 2011 report reflects the 
changes in the corporate governance landscape since 2003 and is intended to continue to support decision-
makers and practitioners in their efforts to take corporate governance to a higher level. The updated priorities for 
reform are: 
 All jurisdictions should strive for active, visible and effective enforcement of corporate governance 
laws and regulations. Regulatory, investigative and enforcement institutions should be adequately 
resourced, credible and accountable, and work closely and effectively with other domestic and external 
institutions. They should be supported by a credible and efficient judicial system. 
 The quality of disclosure should be enhanced and made in a timely and transparent manner. 
Jurisdictions should promote the adoption of emerging good practices for non-financial disclosure. 
Asian Roundtable jurisdictions should continue the process of full convergence with international 
standards and practices for accounting and audit. 
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 Board performance needs to be improved by appropriate further training and board evaluations. The 
board nomination process should be transparent and include full disclosure about prospective board 
members, including their qualifications, with emphasis on the selection of qualified candidates. Boards 
of directors must improve their participation in strategic planning, monitoring of internal control and 
risk oversight systems. Boards should ensure independent reviews of transactions involving managers, 
directors, controlling shareholders and other insiders. 
 The legal and regulatory framework should ensure that non-controlling shareholders are adequately 
protected from expropriation by insiders and controlling shareholders.  
 Shareholder engagement should be encouraged and facilitated, in particular by institutional investors.   
 
6. Conclusion   
The impact of good corporate governance is being comprehended in the Asian region throughout the last decade. 
Public and private sector institutions should continue to make the business case for the value of good corporate 
governance among companies, board members, gatekeepers, shareholders and other interested parties, such as 
professional associations. The implementation and monitoring of audit and accounting standards should be 
overseen by bodies independent of the profession. Key stakeholders like external auditors, rating agencies, 
advisors and intermediaries should be able to inform and advise shareholders free of conflicts of interest. 
Accordingly, corporate governance can act as a glue of harmonization in the corporate setting.  
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